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Cross-border information transfers: evidence
from profit warnings issued by European
firms
Paulo Alves, Peter F. Pope and Steven Young*
Abstract — This paper reports evidence on cross-border accounting information transfers associated with profit warning
announcements. Using a sample of firms from 29 European countries, we find that negative earnings surprises disclosed by
firms in one country affect investors’ perceptions of comparable non-announcing firms in other countries. The form and
magnitude of cross-border effects is consistent with domestic transfers. Tests explaining variation in cross-border
information transfers provide some (albeit rather limited) evidence that effects vary according to a range of firm-, industry-
and country-level characteristics.
Keywords: information transfers; profit warnings; stock market reaction; cross-border effects
1. Introduction
Prior research provides evidence of within-country
information transfers in response to earnings-
related news (Firth, 1976; Foster, 1981; Clinch
and Sinclair, 1987; Han and Wild, 1990; Freeman
and Tse, 1992; Baginski, 1987; Han et al., 1989;
Pyo and Lustgarten, 1990; Tse and Tucker, 2006).
In contrast, the extent to which investors and
analysts extrapolate earnings information across
national boundaries has been largely overlooked in
the literature despite the relentless globalisation of
capital and product markets. This paper reports
evidence on the incidence and magnitude of cross-
border accounting information transfers within
Europe.
The essence of our study is perhaps best
illustrated by the following example. On 23
June 2003 Dutch brewing giant Heineken
announced that half-yearly earnings growth
would remain flat. Not only did the news prompt
a 12% drop in Heineken’s share price; it also
caused shares in Interbrew (Belgium) and
Carlsberg (Denmark) to fall by 4% and 5%,
respectively (Financial Times, 24 June 2003).
Clearly, investors and analysts considered news of
Heineken’s performance useful in updating
expectations about other firms in the European
brewing sector. With more firms transacting a
larger fraction of their business across national
boundaries, the relevance of financial results
released by firms in one country for their foreign
peers is likely to be on the rise.
We test for evidence of cross-border informa-
tion transfers using profit warnings (i.e. voluntary
trading updates that signal a material deterioration
in profitability and earnings relative to market
expectations). Our analysis utilises 4,283 firms
from 29 European countries over the period
January 1997 through December 2007.
Restricting the analysis to European-listed firms
represents a compromise between scope and
feasibility. It also yields a sufficiently broad
cross-section of economic, political and regulatory
environments to facilitate a rich analysis of cross-
border effects, while simultaneously ensuring that
earnings information remains relevant for non-
announcing firms (by confining the analysis to a
single economic zone).
Tests provide evidence that negative earnings
surprises affect investors’ perceptions of compar-
able foreign non-announcing firms. The average
market-adjusted price reaction for foreign non-
announcers is statistically negative, suggesting that
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contagion effects dominate in the cross-section.
Non-announcing firms are also associated with
abnormally high trading volume and downward
revision in analysts’ earnings forecasts during the
announcement window. Comparing the magnitudes
of within- and cross-country transfers reveals that
the average market reaction for foreign non-
announcers is statistically similar to that experi-
enced by domestic non-announcers. Cross-sec-
tional tests provide evidence that cross-border
transfers vary according to firm-, industry- and
country-level characteristics. However, results are
far from clear-cut: findings vary across alternative
market response metrics; associations are not
symmetric with respect to contagion and competi-
tive effects; and the explanatory power of the
models is typically low.
Evidence concerning cross-border information
transfers contributes to prior research in several
ways. First, Firth (1996a) is the only published
study to our knowledge that directly tests whether
investors and analysts extrapolate earnings infor-
mation across national boundaries from announcing
to non-announcing firms. While Firth’s (1996a)
results provide evidence consistent with cross-
border information transfers associated with cor-
porate earnings announcements, his analysis is
restricted to two countries with strong economic
and institutional links (the US and UK). Despite
these commonalities, however, Firth (1996a) docu-
ments asymmetry in the strength of cross-border
transfers, with larger effects observed for US
announcers. Our analysis extends Firth (1996a) by
documenting the presence of earnings-related infor-
mation transfers in a more extensive set of countries
characterised by a broader range of political, legal,
and financial reporting arrangements. Second, evi-
dence on cross-border earnings information trans-
fers speaks to the ongoing debate surrounding the
impact of international accounting diversity on the
usefulness of financial statement data. The demand
for improved harmonisation of international finan-
cial reporting practices to facilitate better compara-
tive analysis is one of the main driving forces
behind the adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). To the extent that our
sample period is characterised by considerable
cross-country accounting diversity, evidence of
cross-border transfers similar in form and magni-
tude to those observed between firms within a
country suggests that GAAP differences do not
necessarily prevent investors from conducting
international comparative analyses. Third, profit
warnings may be viewed as a special category of
management forecasts. Although the literature on
management forecasts is extensive (see Hirst et al.,
2008), few papers have examined management
forecasts in an international context.1 Our paper
contributes to this line of research by providing
evidence on the incidence and informativeness of
profit warnings in a broad set of European countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. Section 2 locates our analysis within the
extant literature. Section 3 describes the research
design and introduces the sample and data used to
test for evidence of cross-border earnings-related
information transfers. Section 4 presents univariate
evidence regarding the incidence and magnitude of
cross-border transfers. Section 5 investigates cross-
sectional variation in the magnitude of cross-border
information transfers. Section 6 summarises a series
of sensitivity tests designed to assess the robustness
of our results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Background, motivation and research
question
Information transfers occur when an announcement
made by one firm contemporaneously provides
information about the performance and value of one
or more non-announcing firms (Schipper, 1990:
97). In the accounting literature, the majority of
information transfer research has focused on earn-
ings-related announcements and events.2 Using a
small sample of UK firms, Firth (1976) tested
whether earnings announcements impact stock
prices of reporting firms’ non-announcing industry
peers. Firth’s (1976) results support the view that
announcing firms’ earnings contain information
relevant for valuing non-announcing firms.
Subsequent research by Foster (1981), Clinch and
Sinclair (1987), Han andWild (1990), Freeman and
Tse (1992), and Joh and Lee (1992) explored intra-
industry information transfers in relation to US
firms’ earnings announcements, while other studies
have examined information transfers associated
with management earnings forecasts (Baginski,
1987; Han et al., 1989; Pyo and Lustgarten,
1990), profit warnings (Tse and Tucker, 2006),
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 450 of 472
1 Notable exceptions include Baginski et al. (2002) who
compare disclosure of management earnings forecasts in US
and Canadian markets, and Frost (2000) who provides
comparative descriptive evidence on disclosures of forward-
looking information in the US and several European countries
for firms in the manufacturing sector.
2 Finance researchers have examined the information transfer
phenomenon in a variety of corporate contexts including
bankruptcy filings (Lang and Stulz, 1992), bank failures
(Aharony and Swary, 1983), merger proposals (Eckbo, 1983),
dividend initiations (Firth, 1996b), stock repurchases (Hertzel,
1991), management buyouts (Slovin et al., 1991), corporate
accidents (Bowen et al., 1983), and public securities offerings
(Szewczyck, 1992).
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and earnings restatements (Xu et al., 2006; Gleason
et al., 2008). The conclusion emerging from this
body of work is that earnings-related news events
are associated with statistically significant transfers
of information from announcing to non-announcing
firms, although the magnitude of the market reac-
tion for non-announcers tends to be considerably
smaller than that observed for announcers.
Earnings surprises containing state-of-the-sector
information may impact announcing firms’ peers in
one of two ways. Surprises that signal changes in
the size of the overall sector pie are expected to
affect announcing and non-announcing firms simi-
larly, with favourable (unfavourable) news leading
to positive (negative) shocks for both groups. These
same-sign information transfers are often labelled
contagion effects. Conversely, holding demand
within a sector constant, an earnings innovation
reported by one firm may signal a shift in its
competitive position with respect to other firms in
the same sector, with a negative (positive) surprise
implying good (bad) news for its non-announcing
peers. Opposite-sign information transfers that
reflect a redistribution of a constant industry pie
are often labelled competitive effects. Although
examples of both types of transfer have been
documented in the literature (Lang and Stulz,
1992; Firth, 1996a), evidence for earnings-related
information transfers suggests that contagion
effects dominate in the cross-section (Firth, 1976;
Foster, 1981; Clinch and Sinclair, 1987; Han and
Wild, 1990; Tse and Tucker, 2006).
While prior research reveals interdependencies
among firms’ share prices based on key accounting
disclosures and major corporate events, results are
almost exclusively confined to within-country
effects. Notable exceptions include studies exam-
ining the Latin American debt crisis (Madura et al.,
1991; Diaz andMcLeay, 1996) and the effects of the
Enron scandal (Cahan et al., 2005). To the best of
our knowledge, Firth (1996a) is the only published
study that tests for evidence of cross-border infor-
mation transfers in the context of earnings disclo-
sures. Firth (1996a) investigates information
transfers between US and UK firms associated
with corporate earnings announcements. Findings
reveal evidence of statistically significant earnings
information transfers, although the cross-border
effects are reliably smaller than corresponding
within-country transfers. US announcers are asso-
ciated with larger cross-border transfers than UK
announcers, reflecting the international importance
of the US corporate sector coupled with earlier
reporting by US firms relative to their UK counter-
parts with comparable fiscal year-ends.
Evidence presented by Firth (1996a) reveals that
institutional, regulatory, and financial reporting
differences between the US and UK are not
sufficient to impede cross-border extrapolation of
corporate earnings surprises. As Firth (1996a)
acknowledges, however, cross-border earnings
information transfers are more likely to exist
between this pair of countries than many other
groups of nations because of the strong linkages
between US and UK financial markets and corpor-
ate activities. An unresolved question is whether
analysts and investors extrapolate earnings infor-
mation across national boundaries in the face of
substantial institutional, legal, political, cultural and
financial reporting differences.
Building on Firth (1996a), we employ a large
sample of firms from a broad set of European
countries to test whether firm-specific earnings-
related news disclosures convey information to
stock market investors about the performance and
value of comparable foreign firms. While the
existence of cross-border earnings-related informa-
tion transfers is intuitively appealing, several factors
militate against observing such effects in practice.
First, such effects rely on the assumption that firm-
specific accounting releases contain common infor-
mation useful in updating expectations about non-
announcing firms. Whereas this assumption may be
axiomatic at the country level for well-developed
financial reporting systems such as the US or UK
(Schipper, 1990), it is less obviously so in a cross-
country setting where the quality of financial
reporting varies and where some accounting sys-
tems are designed for purposes other than reflecting
underlying economic reality (e.g. tax-based sys-
tems). Second, Ball (2006) conjectures that despite
extensive international integration of capital and
product markets, most economic and political
activity remains intranational. To the extent that
firms’ activities are shaped largely by domestic
considerations rather than global factors, the scope
for cross-border information transfers for the aver-
age firmmay be limited. Third, even when earnings-
related information transfers do occur, the empirical
challenge of detecting such activity is far from
straightforward (Schipper, 1990). The problem of
low power is likely to be especially acute in a cross-
country setting given heterogeneity in economic,
political, cultural and regulatory factors (Firth,
1996a).
We test for evidence of cross-border earnings-
related information transfers in Europe using a
sample of profit warning announcements. Profit
warnings offer several research design advantages
with respect to our analysis. First, since earnings
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 451 of 472
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information transfers are likely to be small and
difficult to detect (Schipper, 1990; Firth, 1996a),
high power tests are required to reject the null
hypothesis of no information spillover. Prior
research indicates that the scope for earnings
transfers is increasing in the magnitude of the
earnings surprise (e.g. Firth, 1996a). Profit warn-
ings, which are associated with dramatic valuation
effects for announcing firms (Kasznik and Lev,
1995; and Clarke, 2001; Helbok and Walker, 2003;
Collett, 2004), therefore provide a potentially
powerful context in which to test for cross-border
transfer effects. Second, whereas periodic earnings
announcements require estimation of the surprise
component, profit warnings represent earnings sur-
prises by construction. Consequently, our tests are
not constrained by the availability of analyst forecast
data, which can be patchy in some European
countries. Third, because profit warnings do not
follow a systematic disclosure pattern during the
fiscal year, they help overcome the problem of cross-
event contamination common to other accounting
disclosures such as annual or interim earnings
announcements that cluster in calendar time.
3. Sample, data and methods
3.1. Sample selection
Our analysis examines whether profit warnings
issued by firms resident in one country convey
information to stock market investors about the
performance and value of similar non-announcing
firms in other countries. For each profit warning
announcement in country k we identify all compar-
able foreign non-announcing firms at the event date
(including firms that warned at other times during
the sample period). Warnings announced between
January 1997 and December 2007 by European
publicly traded firms form the basis of our tests.3
Profit warning data are obtained from JCF Quant/
Factset (now ExtelConnect). The sample period
begins in 1997 because coverage of profit warning
announcements on JCF is limited prior to this date.
The sample selection procedure involves first
identifying all European-listed firms included in the
JCF proprietary international industry portfolios
with market capitalisation data for at least one fiscal
year-end during the sample period.4 The resulting
sample comprises 11,835 firms from 30 countries.
The total number of profit warnings available on
JCF for these firms during the sample window is
3,635.5 Financial statement and market data
required for our tests are drawn from Datastream.
While only 6,135 firms (52%) from the initial JCF
sample are located on Datastream, the correspond-
ing reduction in the profit warning sample to 2,482
observations is less than 32%. This is consistent
with our matching procedure excluding a dispro-
portionately high number of small firms that are less
likely to warn. This preliminary sample is then
refined as follows. First, observations with missing
announcement-period price data required for our
market reaction tests are excluded. Second, profit
warnings for which a comparable foreign non-
announcer cannot be identified at the event date are
excluded because our tests require at least one
foreign non-announcing peer firm. Third, profit
warnings released within four days of a warning
issued by another firm in the same sector are
excluded to avoid possible contamination caused by
overlapping event windows. Fourth, warnings with
non-negative announcement-period abnormal
returns for the issuing firm are removed because
such observations further complicate our analysis.6
Fifth, firms classified by JCF as investment trusts
are excluded due to the unique nature of their
regulatory and financial reporting environment. We
also drop firms that JCF does not allocate to a
specific industry sector. Finally, countries and
industry-year combinations with fewer than three
firms are excluded because it is hard to draw
meaningful conclusions about cross-border infor-
mation transfers from such sparse data. The final
sample consists of 4,283 firms drawn from 29
countries, and 1,357 profit warnings issued by firms
from 20 countries. Most firms (3,479) did not warn
during our sample period. Of the 804 announcing
firms, 497 (62%) issued a single warning, 165 firms
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 452 of 472
3 Rules governing when and how European firms issue
warnings vary across countries. For example, Berglund and
Westerholm (2007) note that Finnish Supervisory Authority
rules require firms to warn when performance or financial
position is worse or better than expected. Similar rules exist in
the UK (e.g. PSI Rule 1 and Rule 2). In contrast, firms in some
countries never issue warnings, suggesting the absence of any
regulatory requirement for firms to update investors in situations
where expectations and actual performance are materially
misaligned.
4 Firms are considered European-listed when their JCF
primary stock listing code refers to a recognised European
exchange.
5 An earlier version of the paper focused on the last warning
issued by a firm in a given fiscal year because JCF only retained
the final announcement for firms issuing multiple warnings
during a fiscal year. Following a database upgrade in late 2007
JCF now reports all profit warning announcements. We
therefore recollected our sample of warnings to avoid potential
sampling biases.
6 Non-negative price responses for the 365 announcements in
our initial sample are most likely caused by ‘positive’ warnings
(see footnote 3 for evidence that regulations in some European
countries require firms to warn when actual performance
exceeds expectations). Sensitivity tests reveal that including
these cases does not impact materially on our findings and
conclusions.
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Table 1
Sample selection and composition
Panel A: Sample selection process
Firms Profit warnings
JCF Factset European population with market capitalisation between
1997 and 2007
11,835 3,635
Datastream European population with market capitalization between
1997 and 2007
11,352 N/A
Intersection of Datastream and JCF Factset samples 6,135 2,482
Less:
Firms with missing price data at announcement date (659) (253)
Investment trusts and unclassified firms (795) (64)
No comparable foreign non-announcers at announcement date (179) (230)
Multiple profit warnings within 4-day window (27) (203)
Profit warnings with non-negative announcement returns (182) (365)
Countries and industry-year combinations with < 3 firms (10) (10)
Final sample 4,283 1,357
Frequency of profit warnings:
No profit warning 3,479 0
One profit warning 497 497
Two profit warnings 165 330
Three or more profit warnings 142 530
Total 4,283 1,357
Panel B: Final sample by country
Country Firms Profit warnings
Austria 91 15
Belgium 133 39
Croatia 17 0
Cyprus 8 0
Czech Republic 38 0
Denmark 113 16
Estonia 13 0
Finland 89 46
France 509 181
Germany 380 86
Greece 123 1
Hungary 3 0
Iceland 20 1
Ireland 69 25
Italy 223 6
Latvia 14 0
Luxembourg 25 5
Netherlands 180 81
Norway 131 25
Poland 71 4
Portugal 68 1
Russia 143 3
Slovakia 4 0
Slovenia 24 0
Spain 132 4
Sweden 172 15
Switzerland 190 47
Turkey 72 0
United Kingdom 1,228 756
Total 4,283 1,357
Vol. 39, No. 5. 2009 453
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(20%) warned twice, and 142 firms (18%) issued
three or more warnings. Sample firms are drawn
from 112 out of 130 JFC international industry
portfolios. Information technology services account
for the largest fraction of warnings (firms) in the
final sample at 4% (3%). Panel A of Table 1
summarises the sample selection process.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency of firms
and warnings by country. The sample is dominated
by firms from the major European exchanges, with
29% of firms (1,228) listed in the UK, 12% (509)
listed in France, and 9% (380) listed in Germany. A
similar pattern is evident for profit warnings.
Untabulated statistics indicate that the proportion
of sample firms issuing at least one warning is
highest for the UK (62%), Finland (52%) and the
Netherlands (45%). Conversely, sample firms in
Croatia, Cyprus, CzechRepublic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey do not issue
warnings. Panel C of Table 1 reports the distribution
of profit warnings by calendar year. The pattern of
warnings tracks the business cycle (Clarke, 2001):
the peak inwarnings coincideswith the stockmarket
slow-down in 2001 and 2002, whereas periods of
strong economic growth such as 1997–2000 and
2004–2006 are characterised by fewer warnings.
3.2. Measuring information transfers
Prior research uses a variety of metrics to measure
accounting-related information transfers including
announcement-period abnormal stock returns (Han
and Wild, 1990; Firth, 1996a; Thomas and Zhang,
2006), announcement-period abnormal trading vol-
ume (Weigand, 1996), and analysts’ earnings fore-
cast revisions (Pownall and Waymire, 1989; Firth,
1996a; Ramnath, 2002). In the absence of compel-
ling theoretical reasons for favouring one particular
approach over another and because each metric is
expected to measure transfer effects with error, we
report results for all three constructs.
We use market-adjusted returns to measure
abnormal stock price movements around the
announcement of a profit warning. Daily abnormal
returns (AR) for firm i from country k on day t are
computed as:
ARikt ¼ Rikt  RMkt; ð1Þ
where R is the Datastream return for firm i on day t
and RM is the corresponding value-weighted mar-
ket return in country k as given by:
RMjt ¼
XJ
j¼1
Rjt6
MVjtPJ
j¼1
MVjt
0
BBB@
1
CCCA; ð2Þ
whereMV is the market value of firm j on day t and J
is the population of stock exchange-listed firms
(including firm i) in country kwith returns available
from Datastream on day t. Since profit warnings
may lead to the transfer of negative or positive news
to non-announcing firms conditional on the com-
petitive nature of the sector (Schipper, 1990), tests
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Table 1
Sample selection and composition (continued)
Panel C: Final sample of profit warnings by calendar year
Calendar year Profit warnings
1997 30
1998 45
1999 18
2000 33
2001 249
2002 202
2003 164
2004 109
2005 156
2006 172
2007 179
Total 1,357
Note: The sample is based on all announcements classified as profit warnings by JCF Quant/Factset. Firms
are considered European-listed when their JCF primary stock listing code refers to a recognised European
exchange. JCF and Datastream data are matched using various combinations of the following company-
specific identifiers: firm name and parts thereof, SEDOL, ISIN and CUSIP. Comparable foreign non-
announcers are defined as firms in the same JCF international industry portfolio as the announcer with a
different primary stock listing code.
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are conducted using both signed and absolute
abnormal return measures.
Our second information transfermeasure is abnor-
mal trading volume (AV) during the period surround-
ing the profit warning announcement. If profit
warnings contain information relevant for valuing
announcing firms’ peers then we should observe
abnormally high levels of trading activity for non-
announcers when a warning is issued. Following
Bailey et al. (2003, 2006), announcement-period
abnormal trading volume is computed as:
AVit ¼ VOLitPt25
s¼t150
VOLis

N
; ð3Þ
where VOL is the trading volume for firm i on day t
and N is the number of trading days from t – 150 to
t – 25. Unlike directional market-based measures
such as price, trading volume provides an absolute
measure of the market response to an announcement
and as such is capable of capturing both positive and
negative information transfers.
If profit warnings contain new insights concern-
ing the expected performance of non-announcing
firms then one might expect peer firms’ analysts to
respond by updating their earnings forecasts to
reflect such changes. Accordingly, our third meas-
ure of information transfers focuses on revisions in
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Analysts’ forecast
revisions (FR) in response to profit warning p
announced on day t are computed as the change in
the IBES mean consensus annual one-period-ahead
earnings per share (EPS) forecast:
FRip ¼ EPSitþn  EPSitk
Pim1
; ð4Þ
where EPS is the IBESmean consensus annual one-
period-ahead EPS forecast for firm i, EPSt-k is the
last consensus EPS forecast available prior to profit
warning announcement date t (k = days 180 to
2), EPSt+n is the first consensus EPS forecast
available after the profit warning announcement (n
= days 1 to 10), and Pm1 is the last available
IBES stock price for the month preceding
announcement date t. Where no consensus forecast
is recorded on IBES between days 2 and 180,
the value ofFR is set to missing to reduce the impact
of stale forecasts. We constrain n at 10 days to limit
the opportunity for subsequent events (in particular
additional warnings) to contaminate the forecast
revision metric. Using a short revision window
yields a relatively conservative forecast update
metric. FR is set equal to zero when no new IBES
consensus EPS value is published during days1 to
10 to reflect the absence of a forecast revision.
3.3. Identifying comparable non-announcing firms
A key research design issue in the earnings
information transfer literature is the procedure for
identifying comparable non-announcing firms.
Consistent with prior research on domestic infor-
mation transfers (Firth, 1976; Foster, 1981; Pownall
and Waymire, 1989; Han and Wild, 1990), our
main tests rely on industry classification to identify
peer firms. Industry groupings are defined accord-
ing to the JCF sector classification. The advantages
of this approach include simplicity, transparency,
and minimal additional data requirements imposed
on the sample. Nevertheless, the approach repre-
sents a crude and potentially noisy grouping
method given the difficulty of allocating firms to
industries (particularly for those operating in mul-
tiple sectors). Accordingly, the industry-based
method is likely to yield relatively low power
tests of the information transfer hypothesis. To
address this concern, we report supplementary tests
in Section 6.2 using two alternative approaches to
identifying non-announcing peer firms.
4. Preliminary results
4.1. Announcer effects
Using profit warnings as the basis for exploring the
cross-border information transfer phenomenon is
predicated on the assumption that warnings repre-
sent significant news events for announcing firms
(which in turn lead to spill-over effects for non-
announcing peer firms). Prior research documenting
how markets react to profit warnings is confined to
the US and UK. Accordingly, Table 2 reports
abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, and
analysts’ earnings forecast revisions for our sample
of European warnings. Since trading volume and
analyst forecast data are missing for a substantial
fraction of observations, sample sizes are smaller
when these metrics are employed.
Pooled sample results reported in PanelA indicate
a significant negative market reaction for announ-
cing firms: the average (median) announcement-day
abnormal return is 10.9% (6.4%), while the
equivalent three-day cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) centred on the announcement date is13.4%
(8.7%).7 In addition, trading volume for the
average (median) announcing firm is 7.7 (4.1)
times higher than normal on the announcement
day (p-value < 0.01, two-tailed test). Finally, the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 455 of 472
7 Similar (though slightly less pronounced) effects are evident
if the 365 warnings associated with non-negative announce-
ment-period abnormal returns are retained in the sample. For
this combined sample of 1,722 warnings, the median announce-
ment-day abnormal return is 3.9% while the median 3-day
CAR is 6.4%.
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consensus EPS forecast for the average announcing
firm falls by 0.3% of price during the 12-day
window ending 10 days after the profit warning
announce-ment (p-value < 0.01, two-tailed test).
Collectively, these results confirm that European
profit warnings contain substantial information
abouttheperformanceandvalueofannouncingfirms.
Panel B of Table 2 presents evidence on the
market response to profit warning announcements
by country. A consistent pattern of negative
announcement-period abnormal returns and abnor-
mally high trading volume is evident for announ-
cing firms in most countries. Exceptions include
Spain for announcement-day abnormal returns and
abnormal trading volume, and Italy for announce-
ment-day abnormal trading volume. However, all
statistical tests and associated inferences for these
two countries should be interpreted with caution
due to sparse data. Abnormal stock price declines
and trading activity are particularly apparent for UK
announcers, where the mean announcement-day
abnormal return (three-day CAR) is 14.1%
(16.3%).8 In contrast to the price and trading
volume metrics, downward forecast revisions in
response to profit warning announcements are less
apparent in many countries with only France,
Germany, Switzerland and the UK displaying
statistically negative mean (median) revisions.
Comparison of mean and median values, however,
reveals larger negative revisions in all countries bar
Spain. Accordingly, while analysts tend not to
adjust downwards their earnings forecasts for the
median profit warning announcer in many coun-
tries, a small set of disproportionately negative
reactions are observed in most countries examined.
Finally, cross-country tests reported in the final row
of Panel B reveal that announcer effects may not be
equivalent across all countries in our sample,
suggesting the need to control for announcing
firms’ country of listing when assessing the inci-
dence and magnitude of cross-border information
transfers.
4.2. Initial evidence on cross-border information
transfers
Table 3 reports evidence on cross-border informa-
tion transfers in response to profit warnings. Results
for comparable domestic transfers (i.e. where non-
announcing firm j is listed in the same country as
announcing firm i) are also presented in Table 3 for
comparison.9
Abnormal returns presented in columns 3–4
reveal statistically significant stock price reactions
for comparable foreign non-announcing firms in
response to profit warning announcements. The
average (median) non-announcing peer firm experi-
ences a price fall of0.14% (0.12%) on the day a
warning is issued, and a CAR of1.29% (0.29%)
over the three-day window centred on the
announcement date. Warnings therefore appear to
represent bad news for the typical non-announcing
firm, consistent with the contagion effects docu-
mented by extant research (e.g. Tse and Tucker,
2006). However, the directional effect of warnings
on the value of foreign non-announcing peer firms
is much less uniform than for announcers: a
substantial fraction of non-announcers (46%)
experience non-negative announcement-day abnor-
mal returns. Cross-border information transfers
associated with profit warnings do not therefore
appear limited to simple contagion effects. Instead,
the impact of warnings appears to be a more
complex phenomenon associated with gains for
some non-announcers (e.g. through actual or
expected increases in market share) and losses for
others. As documented in previous studies of
domestic information transfers, average spill-over
pricing effects tend to be small in economic terms
(despite their statistical significance). These small
magnitudes, coupled with measurement error in
abnormal returns, could also account for observed
heterogeneity in our pricing results.
Insofar as profit warnings are associated with
contagion effects for some non-announcers and
competitive effects for others that are roughly
symmetric in magnitude, analysis of average signed
returns could mask separately non-trivial negative
and positive price reactions. Accordingly, columns
6–7 in Table 3 present findings for absolute
abnormal returns.10 Results reveal relatively large
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 457 of 472
8 Results for the UK are consistent with those documented by
Clarke (2001) for the period 1994–2000 and Collett (2004) for
the period 1995–2001. Announcement day returns are less
negative than those reported by Helbok and Walker (2003) for
the period 1992–1998.
9 The domestic sample is smaller than the cross-border
sample for two related reasons. First, there are fewer warnings
with sufficient non-announcers because the domestic pool of
industry peers is smaller than the international pool. Second and
for similar reasons, the pool of potential non-announcers is
smaller conditional on a warning being included in our final
sample, resulting in fewer comparable firms for each announce-
ment (and since a firm may be a non-announcer for more than
one warning the effect is multiplicative).
10We explored results for foreign non-announcers condi-
tional on whether the sign of their announcement-period
abnormal returns is the same as that observed for announcers
(contagion subsample) or opposite to that observed for
announcers (competitive subsample). Splitting the sample on
the basis of contagion versus competitive effects reveals
statistically and economically significant signed abnormal
returns of approximately 1% in magnitude in both samples.
However, whereas announcement-period abnormal returns in
the contagion subsample are negative, those in the competitive
subsample are positive.
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and statistically significant pricing effects: mean
(median) absolute announcement-day returns are
equal to 1.84% (0.99%), while the cumulative effect
for days 1 to +1 exceeds 4.40% (1.90%). In
absolute terms, therefore, cross-border transfers
appear economically significant. The large magni-
tude of absolute abnormal returns (relative to signed
returns) is further evidence that profit warnings lead
to contagion and competitive effects for foreign
non-announcers that net off when aggregated in a
signed return metric.
Columns 9–10 and 12 in Table 3 present results
for abnormal trading volume and analyst forecast
revisions, respectively, in response to profit warning
announcements. Mean announcement-period trad-
ing volume is approximately double the normal
level for comparable foreign non-announcers (sig-
nificant at the 0.01 level). The mean non-announcer
also experiences a statistically significant down-
ward revision in analysts’ consensus earnings
forecast during the 12-day period ending 10 days
after a warning is issued. Although medians are
closer to zero, non-parametric tests confirm the
presence of abnormally high trading volume and
downward revisions in analysts’ forecast. Overall,
these findings are consistent with the abnormal
return results and provide further evidence that
profit warnings generate cross-border information
transfers that on average involve contagion effects.
Comparative results for domestic non-announ-
cers are reported beneath the cross-border findings
in Table 3. Consistent with prior research, statistic-
ally significant contagion effects for domestic same-
sector non-announcing firms are evident. More
relevant to our analysis, however, is the relative
magnitude of domestic and cross-border results.
Firth (1996a) predicts and finds that domestic
information transfers for UK and US firms are
larger than corresponding cross-border effects.
Results reported in Table 3 for signed abnormal
returns suggest a different pattern. Although domes-
tic returns tend to be more negative than cross-
border returns, differences are small and statistically
insignificant in most cases. Only median announce-
ment-day returns are significantly more negative for
the domestic sample (at the 0.05 level). A similar
pattern is evident for absolute abnormal returns and
analyst forecast revisions: average cross-border
effects are broadly comparable with domestic
information transfers. While differences between
domestic and cross-border effects are apparent for
abnormal trading volume, conclusions are sensitive
to choice of announcement window. The absence of
systematic differences in the magnitudes of domes-
tic and cross-border effects, and the extent to which
this reflects increased levels of globalisation and
cross-border trade, is a theme that we return to in
Section 6.2.
4.3. Country-level results
Table 4 reports cross-border information transfers
by country. Panel A presents evidence for foreign
same-sector non-announcers conditional on the
nationality of the announcing firm. (For example,
where the announcing firm is French, Panel A
reports the market reaction for all non-French non-
announcing peer firms.) We restrict the discussion
to median values because distributions for the
market reaction metrics are characterised by
extreme observations. Significant cross-country
variation in medians is evident for all four metrics
suggesting that announcer nationality may influ-
ence the informativeness of the warning for foreign
non-announcers. There is some evidence that
announcers from France and countries classified
as ‘Others’ tend to produce the largest impact on
comparable foreign non-announcers whereas
German and UK announcers are consistently asso-
ciated with statistically significant transfers that are
more moderate in magnitude. However, country
rankings are unstable across the different market
metrics making reliable ordering impossible.
Similar results are apparent in Panel B where
announcement-period effects are grouped accord-
ing to non-announcing firms’ nationality. (For
example, we pool across all French same-sector
non-announcers regardless of the nationality of
announcing firms.) While significant cross-country
variation is again evident across all four metrics,
consistent patterns are hard to detect because
country rankings vary depending on the particular
market reaction variable examined.
Overall, findings presented in Table 4 suggest
that both announcing and non-announcing firms’
nationality may influence the form and magnitude
of the information transfer. However, country
effects vary considerably according to the particular
market reaction metric examined and no single
country or group of countries is associated with
consistently strong or weak effects.
5. Cross-sectional analysis
To shed further light on the properties of cross-
border information transfers associated with profit
warnings we augment univariate market reaction
results with cross-sectional tests that relate the
announcement-period market response for compar-
able foreign non-announcers to a series of firm-,
industry- and country-level attributes. The follow-
ing section develops our empirical predictions and
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 459 of 472
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explains our modelling strategy. Results are
reported in Section 5.2.
5.1. Predictions and model
It is well established that investors’ response to
earnings-related news is positively associated with
the magnitude of the earnings surprise. While the
majority of prior research reports evidence for
announcing firms (e.g. Foster et al., 1984), findings
from the information transfer literature demonstrate
that domestic information spillovers are also
increasing in the size of the announcing firm’s
earnings surprise (Foster, 1981; Thomas and Zhang,
2006). Firth (1996a) extends the analysis to cross-
border transfers between US and UK firms and finds
similar evidence. Consistent with Firth (1996a),
therefore, we predict that cross-border information
transfers in response to profit warnings are increas-
ing in the magnitude of the negative earnings
surprise observed for the announcing firm. The
announcement-period abnormal return experienced
by the issuing firm represents an indirect proxy for
the surprise component in a warning.11
Accordingly, we predict that cross-border informa-
tion transfers will be more (less) pronounced for
profit warnings accompanied by large (small)
negative abnormal returns.
Timely information transfers rely partly on the
assumption that investors in non-announcing firm j
are able to identify and process relevant information
released by firm i. Evidence of information transfers
is therefore expected to be more dramatic when the
barriers to identifying and processing pertinent
information are low. One factor expected to help
facilitate information exchange between firms is
common analyst following. Analysts specialise in
processing earnings-related information and under-
standing its implications for announcers and their
competitors. For example, analysts’ reports rou-
tinely discuss and evaluate earnings-related infor-
mation from the perspective of an announcer’s
sector in general and its peers in particular.
Comparative analysis of the type performed by
equity analysts is expected to facilitate information
exchange between peer firms. Moreover, since
analysts specialise by sector (Ramnath et al.,
2008), firms with common analysts may be con-
sidered more comparable than those characterised
by wholly independent analyst coverage (Ramnath,
2002). Accordingly, the absence of at least one
shared analyst may proxy for firms between which
earnings information transfers are unlikely to occur.
Collectively, these factors suggest that the scope for
information transfers between any given firm pair
will be more pronounced when both are tracked by
at least one common analyst.
Cross-border information transfers are also
expected to be larger when announcing and com-
parable non-announcing firm performance is deter-
mined by a common set of factors (Firth, 1996a). A
simple measure of relatedness for any given pair of
firms is the degree to which their respective stock
prices covary.12 We therefore expect the magnitude
of cross-border information transfers associated
with profit warnings to be increasing in the degree
of covariation between non-announcing firms’ stock
returns and those of the corresponding announcer.
The amount of common industry information
contained in a profit warning is likely to vary over
time with the business cycle. All else equal,
warnings issued during periods of economic pros-
perity are more likely to reflect problems specific to
an announcer rather than generic sector-wide
trends. Conversely, warnings issued during periods
of economic slowdown are more likely to capture
systemic performance problems within a sector. As
a result, the magnitude of cross-border information
transfers is expected to be larger for profit warnings
issued during periods of economic contraction.
Intra-industry cross-border information transfers
are also expected to be contingent on the prevailing
competitive structure within a sector. For example,
earnings surprises are expected to provide particu-
larly useful information for assessing the perform-
ance and value of announcers’ peers in industries
where firms follow similar strategies and face
exposure to comparable market pressures. In con-
trast, earnings surprises are likely to be less
informative about non-announcing firm perform-
ance and value in sectors characterised by greater
product market segmentation and strategic differ-
entiation. The level of strategic differentiation
(direct competition) is expected to be decreasing
(increasing) in the degree of industry concentration.
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 461 of 472
11 As Firth (1996a: 314) discusses, a problem with this
approach is that the association between stock returns of
announcing and non-announcing firms may be due to
misspecification of the expected return model (e.g. market-
adjusted returns fail to control for industry-related factors). The
alternative approach is to use to a direct measure of earnings
surprise. Unfortunately, ExtelConnect does not provide infor-
mation on the magnitude of the earnings surprise associated
with a profit warning. Our inability to control for the magnitude
of the warning represents an important limitation of our
analysis.
12 Firth (1996a) focuses on the extent to which non-announ-
cers’ earnings covary with those of the announcing firm, based
on 10 years of quarterly earnings changes. The absence of
quarterly data in Europe and an insufficient time-series of
annual observations for most firms prevent us from adopting a
similar approach.
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We therefore expect cross-border information trans-
fers in response to profit warnings to be more
pronounced in concentrated industries.
Stronger cultural and economic links are pre-
dicted to reduce barriers to cross-border information
flows by increasing investors’ ability to obtain and
interpret firm-specific information (Bell et al., 2006:
15). To the extent that social and fiscal differences
inhibit the flow of information between firms in
different countries, cross-border information trans-
fers are expected to be more pronounced between
firms from countries with shared economic and
cultural traditions (Firth, 1996a). Our proxy for the
strength of cultural and economic integration is
geographic proximity: all else equal, neighbouring
countries are expected to be culturally and eco-
nomically more similar than geographically remote
countries. We therefore predict that the magnitude
of cross-border information transfers will be greater
for firms from neighbouring countries relative to
firms that are geographically remote.
The above predictions are tested using the
following OLS regression model:
MRmjpt ¼ g0 þ g1ARip þ g2COMANALjt þ g3CORRjt
þg4CLIMATEt þ g5HERFjt þ g6NEIGHBOURj
þ
XN
n¼1
lnControlsjn þ ejpt ð5Þ
Variable definitions for Equation (5) are as follows:
MRm is the mth market reaction metric for compar-
able foreign non-announcer j in response to profit
warning p released byfirm i at time t (m equals three-
day cumulative abnormal returns, absolute three-day
cumulative abnormal returns, abnormal trading
volume, or analysts’ forecast revisions); AR is the
announcement-day abnormal return for announce-
mentfirm i issuingprofitwarningp;COMANAL is an
indicator variable that takes the value of one if non-
announcingfirm j has at least one analyst in common
with announcingfirm i, and zero otherwise;CORR is
the Pearson correlation coefficient between stock
returns for announcing firm i and non-announcing
firm j (computed using daily returns over days t–250
to t–10);CLIMATE is an indicator variable taking the
value of one if profit warning p was announced
during a period of economic contraction (calendar
years 2000 through2003) and zero otherwise;HERF
is the Herfindahl index of global industry concen-
tration (computed using revenues for all firms in the
corresponding JCF international industry portfolio);
NEIGHBOUR is an indicator variable that takes the
value of onewherefirms i and j are listed in countries
that share a national border and zero otherwise;
Controls is a vector of N additional factors that may
also influence the magnitude of the information
transfer; and e is the regression residual. Separate
versions of Equation (5) are estimated for the m
dependent variables.
With little theory to guide the selection of
appropriate control variables, our final choice is
unavoidably arbitrary. We include firm size (natural
logarithm of market capitalisation) because larger,
higher profile firms may be associated with more
pronounced information transfer effects. We also
control for firms’ global status (measured by
inclusion in the Morgan Stanley MSCI global
stock index) on the basis that cross-border infor-
mation transfers may be larger for firms with greater
international exposure. Analyst following is
included to control for differences in firms’ general
information environment. We also control for
GAAP regime (IFRS, US GAAP and UK GAAP
versus the remainder) because cross-border infor-
mation transfers could be influenced by financial
reporting quality. Measures of all control variables
are constructed separately for announcing and non-
announcing firms. Finally, in view of significant
cross-country variation in the market reaction to
profit warnings for announcers (Table 2) and non-
announcers (Table 4), we include two vectors of
country indicator variables to capture unmodelled
country-level effects for announcers and non-
announcers, respectively.13
As Firth (1996a: 318) discusses, coefficient
predictions in regressions using signed market
reaction metrics (i.e. cumulative abnormal returns
and analysts’ forecast errors) will differ according to
whether a transfer leads to contagion or competitive
effects. For example, where warnings lead to
contagion, more (less) pronounced transfers should
yield more (less) negative realisations of the
dependent variable. In contrast, where warnings
are associated with competitive effects, more (less)
pronounced transfers should yield more (less)
positive realisations of the dependent variable. To
avoid these opposing effects netting out in the cross-
section, empirical tests should allow for coefficient
sign switches. We permit coefficient signs to vary
according to the type of information transfer by
estimating separate versions of Equation (5) condi-
tional on contagion and competitive effects. Absent
any reliable ex ante means of distinguishing
between contagion and competitive transfers, we
follow Firth (1996a) and use non-announcing firms’
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 462 of 472
13 Sensitivity tests exploring the impact of alternative variable
definitions and model specifications yield results that are similar
to those reported in Table 5. Further details of these tests are
presented in Section 6.2.
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announcement-day abnormal return realisations to
partition observations. Since profit warnings repre-
sent negative earnings surprises, we interpret
instances where non-announcers experience nega-
tive (positive) announcement-day abnormal returns
as cases of contagion (competitive effects).
Conversely, where the dependent variable in
Regression (5) is an unsigned measure of market
reaction (i.e. absolute abnormal returns and trading
volume), coefficient signs for our test variables will
remain constant irrespective of whether information
transfers reflect contagion or competitive effects.
Nevertheless, we follow the approach adopted for
signedmarket response metrics and present separate
results partitioned on the sign of non-announcers’
returns to allow for variation in the magnitude of
predicted associations between contagion and com-
petitive effect cases.
5.2. Results
Table 5 reports coefficient estimates and model
summary statistics for Regression (5). (Coefficient
estimates are multiplied by 102 to assist tabulation.)
Panel A (B, C, and D) presents results for three-day
CARs (three-day absolute CARs, three-day abnor-
mal trading volume, and forecast revisions) parti-
tioned according to the sign of non-announcing
firms’ announcement-period abnormal return.
Results including and excluding control variables
are reported in each case. To reduce the impact of
extreme observations the 1st and 99th percentiles of
the following variables are removed prior to
estimation: three-day CARs, three-day abnormal
trading volume, forecast revisions by model, and
market value for non-announcing and announcing
firms for all models.14 Since our sample contains
multiple non-announcers for a single profit warn-
ing, regression residuals are likely to be correlated
across firms. Further, since some firms issue
multiple warnings during the sample period (see
Table 1), regression residuals may also be correlated
across time. Table 5 therefore reports probability
values based on clustered standard errors (Petersen,
2009), with clustering performed by profit warning
announcement and calendar year.
Results provide mixed evidence with respect to
the predicted determinants of cross-border transfers.
On the one hand, the majority of test variables
display some evidence consistent with their pre-
dicted impact on cross-border information transfers.
On the other hand, insofar as no variable is
consistently significant with the predicted sign
across all four market response metrics for both
the contagion and competitive effect partitions,
findings reported in Table 5 provide only partial
support for the predictions developed in Section
5.1. Further, the poor explanatory power of all
models presented in Table 5 suggests that the
primary determinants of cross-border information
transfers remain elusive.
Findings for individual test variables are as
follows. Evidence supporting the prediction that
cross-border transfers are increasing in the size of
the earnings surprise (proxied by AR) is evident in
Panels A (CARs) and B (absolute CARs) for both
contagion and competitive effect samples. In con-
trast, estimated coefficients on AR in Panel D
(forecast revisions) are insignificant, although coef-
ficient signs are as predicted, while coefficient signs
in Panel C (abnormal trading volume) are contrary
to predictions. Results provide no support for the
prediction that cross-border information transfers
are more pronounced when announcers and non-
announcers share at least one common analyst.
Indeed, coefficient estimates on COMANAL are
significant and in the opposite direction to our
predictions in Panels A and B for Model 1, although
these inconsistent findings are not apparent in
Model 2 where control variables are included.
The degree of covariance between non-announ-
cing firms’ stock returns and those of the corres-
ponding announcer is associated with cross-border
transfers as predicted in Panels A (CARs) and B
(absolute CARs) for models where control variables
are included. Conversely, coefficient estimates on
CORR in Panels C and D are statistically indistin-
guishable from zero at conventional significance
levels. Evidence consistent with more pronounced
cross-border transfer effects for profit warnings
issued during periods of economic contraction is
apparent in Panels A (CARs) and B (absolute
CARs) for both contagion and competitive groups,
and in Panel D (forecast revisions) for contagion
cases only. Contrary to predictions, however,
DECLINE is positively associated with abnormal
trading volume (Panel C) and forecast revisions
(Panel D) for the competitive transfer partition.
Support for the predicted link between cross-border
information transfers and industry concentration is
also evident in Panels A and B for both contagion
and competitive groups, and Panel D for the
contagion group. Finally, although the magnitude
of cross-border transfers varies with the strength of
countries’ cultural and economic links in the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 463 of 472
14 Results are not sensitive to alternative trimming proced-
ures. Estimating Equation (5) prior to trimming yields broadly
similar conclusions for AR, COMANAL, CORR and DECLINE.
However, coefficient estimates on HERF are generally insig-
nificant using untrimmed data. The explanatory power of all
models is systematically lower pre-trimming.
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Table 5
OLS regression coefficient estimates and summary statistics for models explaining the market reaction
for comparable foreign non-announcers (probability values in parentheses)
Contagion (ARj < 0) Competitive effect (ARj ³ 0)
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Sign Model 1 Model 2
Panel A: 3-day CARs
Intercept ? –2.76 (0.01) –3.29 (0.01) ? 2.89 (0.01) 3.34 (0.01)
AR + 2.13 (0.01) 1.93 (0.01) – –1.38 (0.01) –1.20 (0.01)
COMANAL – 0.22 (0.01) 0.04 (0.70) + –0.33 (0.01) –0.04 (0.57)
CORR – –0.60 (0.13) –1.15 (0.01) + –0.07 (0.88) 0.54 (0.06)
DECLINE – –0.92 (0.01) –0.86 (0.01) + 0.56 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01)
HERF – –0.48 (0.06) –0.49 (0.02) + 0.39 (0.10) 0.31 (0.12)
NEIGHBOUR – –0.02 (0.43) 0.02 (0.44) + –0.05 (0.39) –0.04 (0.55)
MVA ? –0.02 (0.54) ? 0.04 (0.05)
MVNA ? 0.09 (0.02) ? –0.15 (0.01)
MSCIA ? 0.08 (0.42) ? –0.22 (0.04)
MSCINA ? 0.12 (0.27) ? –0.03 (0.81)
ANALA ? –0.00 (0.67) ? –0.00 (0.16)
ANALNA ? 0.00 (0.85) ? 0.01 (0.07)
GAAPA ? 0.17 (0.25) ? 0.26 (0.15)
GAAPNA ? 0.12 (0.16) ? –0.14 (0.12)
Country dummiesA No Yes No Yes
Country dummiesNA No Yes No Yes
Adj-R2 0.061 0.066 0.028 0.037
N 16,833 15,940 14,052 13,399
Panel B: 3-day ACARs
Intercept ? –390.03 (0.01) –369.31 (0.01) ? –402.52 (0.01) –392.93 (0.01)
AR – –80.64 (0.01) –73.04 (0.01) – –48.30 (0.01) –38.90 (0.01)
COMANAL + –7.45 (0.01) 0.85 (0.40) + –8.94 (0.02) 0.02 (0.50)
CORR + 24.90 (0.12) 47.57 (0.01) + 8.24 (0.29) 24.94 (0.02)
DECLINE + 35.68 (0.01) 33.92 (0.01) + 23.64 (0.01) 25.18 (0.01)
HERF + 26.36 (0.01) 26.12 (0.01) + 10.15 (0.14) 7.42 (0.20)
NEIGHBOUR + 3.71 (0.11) 2.72 (0.22) + 0.79 (0.40) 1.09 (0.36)
MVA ? 0.01 (0.99) ? 0.92 (0.36)
MVNA ? –2.74 (0.03) ? –4.17 (0.02)
MSCIA ? –4.03 (0.33) ? –8.70 (0.02)
MSCINA ? –4.69 (0.14) ? 2.20 (0.58)
ANALA ? –0.06 (0.71) ? –0.19 (0.17)
ANALNA ? 0.02 (0.67) ? 0.24 (0.00)
GAAPA ? –4.99 (0.45) ? 13.83 (0.02)
GAAPNA ? –2.67 (0.53) ? –1.36 (0.71)
Country dummiesA No Yes No Yes
Country dummiesNA No Yes No Yes
Adj-R2 0.055 0.058 0.025 0.031
N 16,999 16,103 13,887 13,243
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Table 5
OLS regression coefficient estimates and summary statistics for models explaining the market reaction
for comparable foreign non-announcers (probability values in parentheses) (continued)
Contagion (ARj < 0) Competitive effect (ARj ³ 0)
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Sign Model 1 Model 2
Panel C: 3-day AVOL
Intercept ? –22.82 (0.04) –21.72 (0.27) ? 12.48 (0.07) 36.44 (0.00)
AR – 17.77 (0.43) 14.07 (0.51) – 24.63 (0.04) 29.69 (0.02)
COMANAL + –2.48 (0.20) 0.11 (0.48) + –8.21 (0.00) –5.88 (0.00)
CORR + 1.36 (0.87) –1.92 (0.81) + –25.47 (0.00) –14.04 (0.03)
DECLINE + 1.78 (0.33) –0.66 (0.90) + –5.54 (0.06) –7.74 (0.07)
HERF + 4.27 (0.36) 6.20 (0.31) + 11.12 (0.09) 7.67 (0.18)
NEIGHBOUR + 0.05 (0.50) –1.11 (0.70) + 0.51 (0.42) 0.56 (0.42)
MVA ? 0.30 (0.79) ? –1.23 (0.40)
MVNA ? –0.59 (0.57) ? –2.51 (0.01)
MSCIA ? 3.03 (0.38) ? 4.51 (0.30)
MSCINA ? 0.64 (0.84) ? –5.93 (0.07)
ANALA ? –0.21 (0.28) ? –0.02 (0.86)
ANALNA ? –0.23 (0.01) ? 0.12 (0.12)
GAAPA ? –5.39 (0.19) ? 1.13 (0.81)
GAAPNA ? –0.12 (0.98) ? –4.61 (0.18)
Country dummiesA No Yes No Yes
Country dummiesNA No Yes No Yes
Adj-R2 0.021 0.026 0.024 0.030
N 6,639 6,286 5,590 5,346
Panel D: FR
Intercept ? –0.03 (0.59) –0.07 (0.43) ? –0.05 (0.26) –0.13 (0.01)
AR + 0.03 (0.12) 0.02 (0.24) – –0.01 (0.80) –0.04 (0.42)
CONANAL – –0.01 (0.39) –0.01 (0.34) + 0.01 (0.43) 0.00 (0.50)
CORR – –0.01 (0.40) –0.01 (0.33) + –0.01 (0.59) –0.03 (0.37)
DECLINE – –0.06 (0.01) –0.06 (0.01) + –0.05 (0.01) –0.06 (0.01)
HERF – –0.07 (0.07) –0.09 (0.03) + –0.04 (0.48) –0.05 (0.49)
NEIGHBOUR – 0.02 (0.05) 0.02 (0.60) + 0.01 (0.25) 0.02 (0.20)
MVA ? –0.00 (0.50) ? 0.01 (0.20)
MVNA ? 0.01 (0.31) ? 0.01 (0.36)
MSCIA ? 0.02 (0.06) ? –0.00 (0.71)
MSCINA ? 0.01 (0.77) ? –0.00 (0.94)
ANALA ? 0.00 (0.14) ? 0.00 (0.30)
ANALNA ? –0.00 (0.01) ? –0.01 (0.01)
GAAPA ? 0.01 (0.19) ? 0.02 (0.51)
GAAPNA ? 0.01 (0.41) ? –0.01 (0.73)
Country dummiesA No Yes No Yes
Country dummiesNA No Yes No Yes
Adj-R2 0.014 0.016 0.010 0.014
N 9,377 8,842 7,641 7,268
Note: The dependent variable in panels A, B, C and D is three-day cumulative abnormal returns centred on
the profit warnings announcement date (CAR), absolute three-day cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR),
three-day abnormal trading volume (AVOL), and revisions in analysts’ consensus EPS forecast (FR),
respectively. (See Tables 2–4 for dependent variable definitions.) Variable definitions for explanatory
variables are as follows: AR is the announcement-day market-adjusted stock return for the corresponding
profit warning announcer; COMANAL is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the comparable
foreigner non-announcer shares at least one analyst with the announcing firm and zero otherwise; CORR is
the Pearson correlation coefficient between stock returns of the non-announcer and the corresponding
announcing firm (computed using daily returns over the period t – 250 to t – 10); DECLINE is an indicator
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predicted direction in the majority of models
presented in Table 5, coefficient estimates on
NEIGHBOUR are generally insignificant.
Overall, findings for our test variables tend to be
more pronounced for abnormal return metrics and
weakest for abnormal trading volume. Results for
several variables are not symmetric across contagion
and competitive effect partitions, with stronger
results typically observed for the contagion group.
Comparison of Model 1 (excluding controls) and
Model 2 (including controls) in each panel reveals
that control variables display little incremental
explanatory power beyond our main test variables.
Although a number of controls display significant
coefficient estimates in one or more models, con-
sistent patterns are hard to detect.An exception is the
country fixed effect vectors, the significance of
which supports evidence presented in Tables 2 and 4
that cross-border information is partly contingent on
country-level factors associated with both announ-
cing and non-announcing firms, respectively.
6. Supplementary analysis
This section presents findings for a series of
additional tests designed to further explore the
form and magnitude of cross-border information
transfers. In the following subsection we implement
a more refined approach to distinguish between
contagion and competitive transfers, while Section
6.2 summarises a battery of additional robustness
tests designed to assess the sensitivity of ourfindings
to alternative specifications and variable definitions.
6.1. Contagion versus competitive effects
Tests reported in the preceding section discriminate
between contagion and competitive effects using the
approach employed by Firth (1996a). However,
partitioning solely on the basis of announcement-
period abnormal returns ignores other market-
response indicators; and insofar as abnormal returns
aremeasuredwitherror, relianceon this singlemetric
is likely tomisclassify observations.We address this
problem by employing an alternative partitioning
method designed to provide a more refined split
between contagion and competitive effects.
Specifically, we use a portfolio approach whereby
observations satisfying the following three condi-
tions were classified as contagion (competitive)
transfers: negative (positive) three-day CAR; three-
day abnormal trading volume greater than one; and a
downward (upward) revision in analysts’ consensus
forecast. If Firth’s unidimensional approach to
distinguishing between contagion and competitive
transfers leads to misclassification problems and
hence lower power tests, we would expect evidence
of cross-border information transfers to be more
pronounced using this three-way split.
The three-way classification method yields 2,486
contagion transfers and 438 competitive transfers.
All remaining observations are discarded. The low
number of observations classified as competitive
effects is consistent with evidence that contagion
transfers dominate in the cross-section. Regression
(5) is re-estimated for the two groups. Coefficient
estimates for our test variables and model summary
statistics are presented in Table 6.15 (Results for
control variables are not tabulated in the interests of
parsimony.) Consistent with the view that a more
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Table 5
OLS regression coefficient estimates and summary statistics for models explaining the market reaction
for comparable foreign non-announcers (probability values in parentheses) (continued)
variable taking the value of one if the profit warning was announced in calendar years 2000 through 2003
and zero otherwise; HERF is the Herfindahl index of global industry concentration (computed using
revenues for all firms in the corresponding JCF international industry portfolio); NEIGHBOUR is an
indicator variable taking the value of one where announcing and non-announcing firms are listed in
countries that share a national border and zero otherwise; MV is the natural logarithm of market
capitalisation; MSCI is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm is a member of the Morgan
Stanley MSCI global stock index and zero otherwise; ANAL is the natural logarithm of analyst following;
GAAP is an indicator variable taking the value of one for firms that report using International Financial
Reporting Standards, US GAAP or UK GAAP, and zero otherwise; Country dummies is a vector of
indicator variables for country of listing; and subscripts A and NA refer to announcers and non-announcers,
respectively. All variables using financial statement data are measured at the fiscal year-end immediately
preceding the relevant profit warning. The full sample is partitioned according to the sign of non-
announcing firms’ announcement day abnormal return (AR) and separate regressions are performed for AR <
0 and AR ³ 0. Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 102 to assist tabulation. Probability values are based
on clustered standard errors and refer to one-tailed tests where coefficient signs are as predicted and two-
tailed tests otherwise.
15 The three-way classification is applied to the pre-trimmed
sample. Variables are then trimmed separately for each regres-
sion model in Table 6 leading to minor variations in sample size
across the four dependent variables.
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refined approach to distinguishing between conta-
gion and competitive transfers helps reduce meas-
urement error in the market reaction metrics, the
explanatory power of all models is substantially
higher than the corresponding models in Table 5.
Coefficient signs and significance levels, however,
are broadly similar to those previously reported
with the following exceptions. In the contagion
regressions, COMANAL is significant with the
wrong sign in the trading volume model, CORR
loses its significance in the absolute return model,
and DECLINE and HERF display the wrong signs
in the forecast revision model. In the competitive
effect regressions, incongruous findings previously
documented for AR, COMANAL and DECLINE in
the trading volume model are no longer evident,
CORR is significant with the predicted sign in the
forecast revision model, while CORR and
DECLINE are insignificant in the cumulative
abnormal return model. Overall, therefore,
Regression (5) continues to provide only limited
insights into the determinants of cross-border
information transfers.16
6.2. Additional sensitivity tests
The first set of robustness tests discussed in this
section relates to the selection of comparable non-
announcing firms. Analyses reported in the preced-
ing sections use industry membership to identify
announcing and non-announcing peers. To the
extent that industry portfolios are constructed
using broad classifications that yield arbitrary firm
groupings, our analyses are likely to generate noisy
tests of the incidence and magnitude of cross-border
information transfers. We therefore repeated key
elements of our analysis using two alternative
methods for selecting comparable non-announcers.
First, in the spirit of Ramnath (2002) we group firms
on the basis of shared analysts. For each profit
warning we identify all foreign non-announcers that
share at least n common analysts with the announ-
cing firm. No constraints are placed on industry
membership so that announcing and non-announ-
cing firms can be drawn from different JFC
international industry portfolios. Absent any clear
guidance about the appropriate number of shared
analysts to use, we experiment with a range of
values for n between 5 and 15. The approach leads
to a dramatic reduction in sample size and a marked
bias towards larger firms.17 Tests reveal no evidence
that matching firms on the basis of shared analysts
leads to more pronounced transfer effects than those
reported in Tables 3 and 4. However, there is some
evidence that contagion is increasing in the number
of common analysts. For example, three-day CARs
(absolute CARs) decline (increase) monotonically
and as the number of shared analysts rises. In
contrast, three-day abnormal trading volume and
analyst forecast revisions are invariant to the level
of common analyst coverage.
Our second method of grouping firms uses
pairwise correlations in stock returns to identify
common firms. For each announcing firm we
compute the pairwise return correlation with every
foreign non-announcer and then define comparable
foreign non-announcers as those with a correlation
coefficient greater than r.18 Correlations are com-
puted using daily returns for days 150 to 25
relative to the profit warning announcement.
Results using values of r between 0.3 and 0.7
yield average cross-border transfers that are either
similar to or smaller than those obtained using the
industry matching method. Collectively, therefore,
our common analyst and correlation tests provide
no evidence that measurement error in the industry-
based method used to select comparable firms
understates the magnitude of cross-border transfers.
Analyses presented in Sections 4 and 5 are
inclusive insofar as they incorporate announcing
and non-announcing firms regardless of their size or
global economic significance. A weakness of this
approach is that it retains small firms with less
exposure to cross-border effects due to the parochial
nature of their business and market. Including such
firms is likely to increase noise in our tests. We
therefore performed two tests where sample firms
were restricted to those likely to have a more global
presence. In the first set of tests, we constrained the
sample to include the largest 10 firms (ranked by
market capitalisation) in each country. In the second
set of tests, we restricted our focus to European-
listed constituents of Morgan Stanley’s MSCI
global stock index. Cross-border information trans-
fers associated with these two alternative sampling
approaches are similar in magnitude to those
reported in Tables 3 and 4, and as such provide no
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 468 of 472
16 To limit the impact of measurement error when partitioning
observations solely on the basis of abnormal return, we also
repeated tests after excluding cases with abnormal return
estimates close to zero. Specially, we defined contagion
(competitive) transfers as cases where abnormal returns £
0.5% (³ 0.5%); all remaining observations where 0.5% <
abnormal return were excluded. Untabulated results are similar
to those presented in Table 5 using the full sample.
17 For example, restricting comparable foreign non-announ-
cers to those that share at least five (10 or 15) analysts with the
announcing firm yields a final sample of 9,338 (1,910 or 569)
observations.
18 The approach is extremely computer intensive. Applying
this method to our sample involved computing over six million
pairwise correlations.
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suggestion that our main findings understate the size
and importance of the phenomenon.
Sample characteristics reported in Table 1 reveal
that UK firms are responsible for a disproportion-
ately large fraction (56%) of the warnings issued
during our sample period, raising the possibility that
our findings may be unduly influenced by a single
country. We therefore repeated our main analyses
after omitting UK profit warnings. While some
minor differences in results are apparent, the overall
tenor of the conclusions is not affected. As an
extension of this analysis, we also examined cross-
border effects for a restricted set of major European
economies (France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain,
Italy and the UK). No material difference in results
is evident using firms from these countries.
A series of supplementary tests were conducted
to assess the sensitivity of results reported in Tables
4–6 to alternative event study specifications includ-
ing: (i) using raw stock returns and abnormal returns
estimated using the market model in place of
market-adjusted returns; (ii) removing zero return
observations from all test and estimation periods;
and (iii) using a range of alternative announcement
windows including days (–1, 0) and (0, +1), as well
as day 0. Results display slight variation across
alternative specifications, most noticeably for the
regression results reported in Table 5 where some
coefficient estimates change sign depending on the
particular specification employed. In almost all
cases, however, these sign changes are associated
with insignificant coefficient estimates. Overall, the
tenor of our findings and conclusions is robust to
changes in key event study parameters.
Although disparities may exist between the
incidence and magnitude of domestic versus
cross-border information transfers, the presence of
widespread inconsistencies could cast doubt on the
validity of cross-border results. To the extent that
evidence of material domestic information transfers
provides an indication that a profit warning contains
relevant information for foreign peers, we would
expect the magnitude of cross-border transfers to be
larger (smaller) in the presence (absence) of a
material domestic transfer effect. We test this
conjecture by classifying profit warnings into two
samples according to whether or not the corres-
ponding average domestic transfer (based on three-
day CARs) is statistically different from zero. We
then compare the average (median) cross-border
market response across the two profit warning
subsamples. Results for the abnormal returns
metrics are consistent with our conjecture: both
contagion and competitive cross-border effects are
more pronounced for the subset of warnings
associated with significant domestic transfers rela-
tive to those for which no significant domestic
transfers exist. In contrast, no difference in the
magnitude of cross-border effects conditional on the
significance of domestic transfers is evident using
the abnormal trading volume and forecast revision
metrics.
Results presented in Table 3 reveal similarities
between cross-border and domestic effects with
respect to the average sign and magnitude of
information transfers. In supplementary tests we
examined the degree to which these average results
mask changes over time in the average level of
cross-border transfers relative to domestic effects.
In particular, we investigated whether the relative
magnitude of cross-border information transfers
increased during our sample period in line with
advancing globalisation. Annual comparisons of
median cross-border transfers against domestic
transfers reveal no evidence of a time-series shift
in relative magnitudes: the average market response
for comparable foreign non-announcers is similar to
that observed for domestic non-announcers
throughout our sample period. Accordingly, we
find no evidence that cross-border effects have
increased (relative to domestic transfers) in recent
years despite the growth in cross-border trade and
steps to harmonise international financial reporting
practices.
We assessed the robustness of results reported in
Table 5 to alternative definitions for a number of our
test and control variables. For example, we experi-
mented with a regional approach to measuring
geographic and cultural proximity that involved
allocating countries to one of five regions. A
REGIONAL indicator variable was then constructed
taking the value of one where announcer and non-
announcer come from countries in the same region
and zero otherwise. Results provided no new
insights beyond those obtained with
NEIGHBOUR. We used a continuous measure of
common analyst following in place of the
COMANAL indicator variable. Findings based on
the continuous variable were generally less pro-
nounced than those reported for COMANAL. In
other tests Spearman correlations were used in place
of Pearson correlations to construct CORR and we
defined DECLINE to include only warnings issued
in calendar years 2000 through 2002. In neither case
did these changes yield results that differed materi-
ally from those reported in Table 5. We replaced
MSCI with a more sophisticated measure of inter-
national exposure derived from firm-specific geo-
graphical segment data. The approach led to a
considerable reduction in sample size due to
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 10/11/2009 03 ABR Young.3d Page 469 of 472
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missing geographical segments. Nevertheless, con-
clusions were identical to those reported in Table 5.
Finally, we expanded Equation (5) to include
controls for legal origin and IFRS adoption.
Coefficient estimates for these variables were not
significant at conventional levels and results for all
other variables were unchanged.
7. Summary and conclusions
This paper reports evidence on the existence and
magnitude of cross-border accounting information
transfers associated with profit warning announce-
ments. While prior research indicates interdepen-
dencies among firms’ share prices based on key
accounting disclosures and major corporate events,
results are almost exclusively confined to within-
country effects. Firth (1996a) is the only study to our
knowledge that examines cross-border information
transfers associated with earnings disclosures.
However, Firth’s study is restricted to analysing
transfers between firms from countries that share
similar economic, institutional and financial report-
ing arrangements. An unresolved question is the
extent to which analysts and investors extrapolate
earnings information across national boundaries in
the face of substantial legal, political, cultural and
financial reporting differences.
We examine cross-border information transfers
between European-listed firms in response to profit
warnings issued between 1997 and 2007. Empirical
tests are based on samples of 4,283firms drawn from
29 European countries and 1,357 profit warnings
issued by firms from 20 countries. Tests provide
some evidence that negative earnings surprises
affect investors’ perceptions of comparable foreign
non-announcingfirms.However, results are far from
clear-cut. Our main findings can be summarised as
follows. First, there is evidence of abnormal market
activity for foreign same-sector non-announcers
surrounding the release of a profit warning, consist-
ent with the existence of cross-border information
transfers among European-listed firms. Second,
warnings are interpreted as bad news for the average
comparable foreign non-announcer, suggesting that
contagion effects dominate in the cross-section.
Nevertheless, markets respond positively for a
surprisingly large fraction of non-announcers,
reflecting either a perceived reallocation of market
share within the sector or measurement error in our
market reactionmetrics. Third, average cross-border
information transfers are similar in character to
domestic transfers. To the extent that domestic
accounting-related information transfers are well
established in the literature, these similarities pro-
vide some comfort regarding the reliability of our
cross-border evidence. Fourth, cross-sectional tests
reveal that cross-border transfers vary according to
firm-, industry- and country-level characteristics.
However, findings vary across alternative market
response metrics; associations are not symmetric
with respect to contagion and competitive effects;
and the explanatory power of the models is typically
low.
Our analysis provides a modest step towards
developing a better understanding of how investors
extrapolate earnings information across national
boundaries. Accordingly, many potentially interest-
ing avenues for further research remain unexplored.
First, it seems likely that our large sample analysis
pools together a small number of material transfer
cases with a large number of negligible responses,
resulting in relatively low power tests. Further
research aimed at identifying the factors that
distinguish material cross-border earnings transfers
from immaterial cases is likely to yield interesting
insights. Second, cross-border information transfers
provide a potentially interesting framework in
which to explore the consequences of international
accounting diversity. While investors are compelled
to think globally, global investment decisions are
complicated by internationally diverse accounting
practices. Investors reading foreign financial state-
ments are frequently confronted with unfamiliar
reporting rules and country-specific nuances.
Additionally, many countries’ financial reporting
rules are not necessarily designed to reflect under-
lying economic performance (Revsine et al., 2002;
Ball et al., 2003). Our preliminary findings suggest
that GAAP diversity may not represent the barrier to
international information flows that some commen-
tators and practitioners suggest. Further work
exploring financial reporting comparability from
an international perspective, with particular
emphasis on benefits of IFRS for cross-border
financial statement analysis, is likely to be of
interest to academics and policymakers alike. Third,
our analysis reveals considerable cross-country
variation in the propensity to issue a profit warning.
Research aimed at understanding how institutional
factors and firm-level incentives influence the
decision to warn (and to issue a management
forecast more generally) is likely to prove informa-
tive, particularly to policymakers concerned with
the regulation of capital markets.
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